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United States.7 3 The Treasury is authorized to designate any of the
Reserve Banks as depositaries of the United States.7 4 Once funds
are intrusted to the duly designated depositary, they are, in effect, in
the Treasury and no longer in the possession of the receiving officer.7 5
Such deposits are insured, and, therefore, the possibility of the public
suffering a loss is reduced tremendously. Since, however, such funds
may never reach the depositary through the negligence or misconduct
of a subordinate, a statute expressly exempting the officer or changing
the conditions of the official bonds seems necessary. When consider-
ing the complexities of the modem public service system, and the in-
equitable results of the operation of the "insurer" rule, it is manifest
that public policy now requires only a limited liability of the officer.7 6
ROSE M. TRAPANI.
THE LIABILITY OF AN OWNER FOR THE NEGLIGENT DRIVING BY A
THIR PERSON.
I.
The automobile has undoubtedly brought to the average man
many social and economic advantages." These advantages, however,
have been obtained at a heavy cost in injury and death. 2 Notwith-
standing the great damage to property and loss of life occasioned by
the use of the automobile on public highways, the courts of New
York,3 as well as the courts in a majority of jurisdictions, 4 have con-
'41 STAT. 654, 655 (1920), 31 U. S. C. §492 (1934).
"'38 STAT. 265 (1913), 12 U. S. C. §§391, 392 (1934).
'Branch v. United States, 100 U. S. 673 (1879).
"' The writer wishes to thank Bernard Newman, Esq., of the New York
Corporation Counsel's office, for his assistance and suggestions in the prepara-
tion of this article.
'Bohlen, 50 Years of Torts (1937) 50 HARV. L. Rtv. 725; for an interest-
ing discussion of the social effects occasioned by the automobile, see 2 ENcyc.
Soc. ScI. 328.
'According to statistics furnished by the Motor Vehicle Bureau, the number
of deaths in the United States during 1937 were 39,700 and the number of
injuries 1,221,090. For the same year, the number of deaths in New York alone
totaled 3,065 and the number of injuries 106,482. At the time of the writing of
this note, the statistics for 1938 had not yet been completed. The New York
Motor Vehicle Bureau, however, approximated that the number of deaths in the
United States in 1938 would amount to 41,685 and the number of injuries
1,272,144. Approximate deaths in New York State for the same period were
estimated at 3,218 and the number of injuries at 112,086.
s "A motor vehicle is not per se of so dangerous a character as to render a
master liable for the negligence of a competent chauffeur to whom the master
loaned the car for private use." Cunningham v. Castle, 127 App. Div. 580,
111 N. Y. Supp. 1057 (1st Dept. 1908); Reilly v. Connable, 214 N. Y. 586,
108 N. E. 853 (1915); Vincent v. Candall & Godley Co., 131 App. Div. 200,
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stantly refused to regard the automobile as an inherently 5 dangerous
instrumentality. The majority rule seems logical, for, if an automo-
bile were considered to be dangerous per se, as dynamite, 6 or ferocious
animals, 7 the rules of common law would not permit its operation on
public highways for general use.8
In view of the fact that a majority of jurisdictions have rejected
the "dangerous instrumentality theory", the liability of the operator
or owner has not generally been that of an insurer, and liability must,
therefore, be predicated on the theory of negligence.9 It is elementary
that after negligence has been established, the negligent operator is
personally liable for all damages proximately resulting,10 regardless
of whether such operator is the owner, agent, servant, or bailee. The
liability of the owner of a motor vehicle for damages occasioned by
the negligence of a third person, however, is not so easily established
nor so conclusively settled. This note is chiefly concerned with this
115 N. Y. Supp. 600 (2d Dept. 1909); Towers v. Errington, 78 Misc. 297,
138 N. Y. Supp. 119 (1912).
'Fielder v. Davidson, 139 Ga. 509, 77 S. E. 618 (1913) ; Christy v. Elliot,
216 Ill. 31, 74 N. E. 1035 (1905); Premier Motor Mfg. Co. v. Tilford, 61 Ind.
App. 161, 111 N. E. 645 (1916); Whitlock v. Dennis, 139 Md. 557, 116 Ati. 68
(1921) ; Fleischner v. Durgin, 207 Mass. 435, 93 N. E. 801 (1911); Coca Cola
Bottling Works v. Brown; 139 Tenn. 640, 205 S. W. 926 (1918); Farlane v.
Winters, 47 Utah 598, 155 Pac. 437 (1916); Cohen v. Meador, 119 Va. 429,
89 S. E. 876 (1916); Steffen v. McNaughton, 142 Wis. 49, 124 N. W. 1016
(1910).
Contra: Schweinhaut v. Flaherty, 49 F. (2d) 533 (App. D. C. 1931), cert.
denied, 283 U. S. 864, 51 Sup. Ct. 656 (1931) (holding a taxicab to be a dan-
gerous instrumentality); Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Anderson, 80 Fla. 441,
86 So. 629 (1920) ; Note (1932) 17 CORN L. Q. 305; for collection of cases, see
16 A. L. R. 255; 5 Ame. JuR. 523, 524.
'Although the courts in the majority of jurisdictions do not regard the
automobile as dangerous per se, many decisions recognize the dangerous poten-
tialities of the vehicle when operated by incompetent, negligent or reckless
drivers. Feitelberg v. Matuson, 124 Misc. 595, 208 N. Y. Supp. 786 (1925) ;
Note (1938) 12 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 281; (1913) 43 L. R. A. (N. s.) 87; Note
(1933) 3 BROOKLYN L. Rav. 58; see cases cited notes 3, 4, suzpra.
O The courts take judicial notice of the fact that dynamite, nitroglycerin
and gunpowder are dangerous agencies, under all circumstances, and at all
times. Mattson v. Minnesota etc. R. R., 95 Minn. 477, 104 N. W. 443 (1905) ;
Peterson v. Standard Oil Co., 55 Ore. 511, 106 Pac. 337 (1910). See also
11 R. C. L. 653, 654.
The liability of an owner of ferocious animals such as lions, bears, etc. is
that of an insurer., Van Leuvan v. Lyke, 1 N. Y. 515 (1848); Malloy v.
Starin, 191 N. Y. 21, 83 N. E. 588 (1908); see 1 R. C. L. 1086, 1087.
8 Jones v. Hoge, 47 Wash. 663, 92 Pac. 443 (1907); see note 7, supra;
(1922) 16 A. L. R. 271.
o O'Tier v. Sell, 252 N. Y. 400, 169 N. E. 624 (1930) ; Lowell v. Williams,
183 App. Div. 701, 170 N. Y. Supp. 596 (2d Dept. 1918), af'd, 228 N. Y. 592
(1920); Douglass v. Hewson, 142 App. Div. 166, 127 N. Y. Supp. 220 (3d
Dept. 1911); Parsons v. Wisner, 113 N. Y. Supp. 922 (App. T. 1909).
20 Uda v. Yale Upholstering Mfg. Co., 229 App. Div. 842, 242 N. Y. Supp.
862 (1st Dept. 1930) ; Towers v. Errington, 78 Misc. 297, 138 N. Y. Supp. 119
(1912); Devuano v. Muller. 126 Misc. 669, 214 N. Y. Supp. 577 (1926), rev'd
in part, 128 Misc. 501, 219 N. Y. Supp. 83 (1926).
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problem. Numerous factual situations with respect to the relation
between the owner and the operator at the time of the accident may
arise which directly affect the owner's liability. It is necessary, there-
fore, in order to understand properly the nature and extent of an
owner's liability for the negligent driving of a third person to con-
sider briefly the common law rules, as well as present statutory
provisions."
II.
The common law principles in respect to an owner's liability for
damages resulting from the negligence of a third person are few and
comparatively simple. Difficulty arises, however, in the application
of these rules to factual situations. The liability of an owner who was
not operating the automobile at the time of the accident was predicated
solely upon the theory of agency, or respondeat superior,12 and this
was so even though it was apparent in many cases that by so limiting
the liability of an owner the injured person was afforded a sorely in-
adequate remedy in the recovery of damages for the injuries he had
suffered. 13 The courts on several occasions deplored the inequitable
results of the unfavorable situation,14 but were so deeply imbedded in
judicial precedent that they expressed the view that the situation could
" N. Y. CONS. LAWS c. 71 (Vehicle and Traffic Law) § 59. For similar
statutes in other states, see CAL. CiV. CODE (1929) § 1714%; IowA CODE (1927)§ 5026; MICH. Comp. LAWS (Cahill, 1915) § 4825, as amended by MICH. PUB.
ACTS 1927, No. 56, MICH. PUB. ACTS 1929, No. 19; ONTARIO HIGHWAY AND
TRAFFIC ACT (1923) § 42(1) ; Note (1931) 17 CORN. L. Q. 158.
'Kellogg v. Church Charity Foundation of L. I., 203 N. Y. 191, 96 N. E.
406 (1911); Reilly v. Connable, 214 N. Y. 586, 108 N. E. 853 (1915); Van
Blaricum v. Dodgson, 220 N. Y. 111, 115 N. E. 443 (1917) ; Stewart v. Baruch,
103 App. Div. 577, 93 N. Y. Supp. 161 (1st Dept. 1905) ; McCann v. Davidson,
145 App. Div. 522, 130 N. Y. Supp. 473 (2d Dept. 1911); Cullen v. Thomas,
150 App. Div. 475, 135 N. Y. Supp. 22 (1st Dept. 1912) ; Tanzer v. Read, 160
App. Div. 584, 145 N. Y. Supp. 708 (1st Dept. 1914); Farthing v. Strouse,
172 App. Div. 523, 158 N. Y. Supp. 840 (2d Dept. 1916).
"In Cohen v. Neustadter, 247 N. Y. 207, 160 N. E. 12 (1928), the court
stated that § 59 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law was enacted by the legislature
chiefly to cure "the remediless plight of a highway traveler injured by a motor
vehicle, other than the one in which he might be travelling, through the reck-
lessness of an irresponsible driver to whom the owner had intrusted the vehicle
and thereby made the accident possible."
" In Cunningham v. Castle, 127 App. Div. 580, 588, 111 N. Y. Supp.
1057 (1st Dept. 1908), the court stated, "It may be that it would be wise and
in the public interests that responsibility for an accident caused by an automo-
bile should be affixed to the owner thereof irrespective of the person driving it
but the law does not so provide." To the same effect see Bohlen, 50 Years of
Torts (1937) 50 HARv. L. Rav. 725, 727, wherein he states, "Perhaps it would
have been for the best had our courts recognized the risk of injury or death
both to motorists and to other travellers which experience has shown to be
inseparable from even careful driving, as sufficient to require of those who use




be remedied only by legislative enactment. judicial opinion on this
point was aptly expressed by Chief Justice Hiscock,15 when he said:
"If contrary to ordinary rules, the owner of a car ought to be
responsible for the carelessness of the person whom he permits
to use it in the latter's own business, that liability ought to be
sought by legislation as a condition of issuing a license rather
than by some new and anomalous slant applied by the courts
to the principles of agency."
Thus, the courts reluctantly, but strictly, applied the principles
of agency as the sole basis of an owner's liability.16 The test applied
was not whether it was convenient or just to consider the negligent
operator the agent of the owner, but was rather, whether the driver
was in fact the agent of the owner in respect to some transaction in
which the driver represented and acted for the owner.'
7
In Potts v. Pardee,'8 a leading common law case, the defendant
owned an automobile which at the time of the accident was being
driven by a chauffeur employed by the defendant's husband. When
the accident occurred both the defendant-owner and her husband were
present in the vehicle. The plaintiff sought to hold the defendant lia-
ble on the ground that she was the owner and was riding in the car
at the time of the accident. The court refused to allow recovery
against the owner on the ground that at the time of the accident there
existed no relation of principal and agent or master and servant be-
tween the defendant-owner and the negligent chauffeur, and conse-
quently the negligence of the chauffeur could not be imputed to the
defendant. In so holding the court stated that as a general rule an
injured person "must seek his remedy against the person whose ac-
tual negligence caused the injury and that person alone is liable.' 9 The
case of master and servant is an exception to the general rule and the
negligence of the latter is imputable to the master where the servant
is doing the act which occasions the injury, and is at the time acting
within the scope of his employment. This exception is based upon
the fact that the servant is standing in the master's place and is rep-
resenting him-since he must obey."
It is apparent that the doctrine of imputed negligence is predi-
cated upon the theory of the employer's control over the agent or
servant.2 0 The presence of the owner in the vehicle, at common law,
'Potts v. Pardee, 220 N. Y. 431, 435, 116 N. E. 78, 80 (1917).
"' See note 12, supra.
'
TVan Blaricum v. Dodgson, 220 N. Y. 111, 117, 115 N. E. 443, 445 (1917);
Note (1933) 3 BRooKLYN L. REv. 58, 59.
8 See note 15, supra.
" King v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R., 66 N. Y. 181 (1886) ; Engle v. Eureka
Club, 137 N. Y. 100, 32 N. E. 1052 (1893) ; see also note 11, supra.
Terwilliger v. Long Island R. R., 152 App. Div. 168, 136 N. Y. Supp. 733
(2d Dept. 1912), aff'd, 209 N. Y. 522, 102 N. E. 1114 (1913) ; Blake v. Brown,
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raised a strong presumption that he had control of its operation 2
but the mere presence of the owner did not necessarily make him
liable.22 The presumption of liability might be rebutted by proof that
at the time of the accident the relationship between the owner and
the operator was not that of principal and agent or master and ser-
vant.23  The courts in a few jurisdictions advanced the rule that the
owner regardless of his relation to the driver was under a duty to
prevent if possible, the driver from operating the vehicle in a dan-
gerous manner or in violation of law.2 4
The strict application of the theory of agency and respondeat
superior as the basis of an owner's liability at common law exempted
the bailor from liability for the consequences of the negligent driving
of the bailee. 25 Under certain circumstances, however, the bailor was
held liable, but in those cases he was in effect held liable for his neg-
ligence in loaning a car that was in need of repair,20 or in loaning
the vehicle to a person who he knew was an incompetent driver.27
The fact that the bailor was present in the automobile at the
time of the accident did not in and of itself make him liable for the
manner in which it was operated,28 for the bailee was deemed to have
180 N. Y. Supp.. 441 (App. T. 1920); Horandt v. Central R. R., 81 N. J. L.
448, 83 Atl. 511 (1911).
Kellogg v. Church Charity Foundation of L. I., 203 N. Y. 191, 96 N. E.
406 (1911) ; Ferris v. Sterling, 214 N. Y. 249, 108 N. E. 182 (1915) ; Matter
of Carrol v. Knickerbocker Ice Co., 218 N. Y. 435, 113 N. E. 507 (1916).
-' See cases cited note 28, inzfra; (1919) 2 A. L. R. 888; (1932) 80 A. L. R.
285, and cases cited therein.
' See cases cited note 12, mupra.
Randolph v. Hunt, 41 Cal. App. 739, 183 Pac. 358 (1919); Harris v.
Boling, 132 Okla. 17, 269 Pac. 274 (1928); see HUDDY, 7, 8 CYCL. OF AuTo.
LAW § 92. There are no cases in New York directly in point. It is apparent
that the application of the rule is limited to those situations wherein the driver
drives negligently for a period of time sufficient to allow the owner to interfere.
The rule could have no application in situations such as the one presented in
Potts v. Pardee, suqpra, wherein it appeared that the only negligent act of the
driver, and the resulting accident, occurred almost simultaneously, and thus the
owner was afforded no opportunity to protest against the manner in which the
vehicle was being driven.
'Van Blaricum v. Dodgson, 220 N. Y. 111, 115 N. E. 443 (1917) ; Tallon
v. Swachhomer, 226 N. Y. 444, 123 N. E. 737 (1919) ; Schultz v. McGuire, 241
N. Y. 460, 150 N. E. 516 (1926) ; Cunningham v. Castle, 127 App. Div. 580,
111 N. Y. Supp. 1057 (1st Dept. 1908); Davis v. Anglo-American Tire Co.,
145 N. Y. Supp. 341 (Sup. Ct. T. T. 1913).
Knapp v. Gould Automobile Co., Inc., 252 App. Div. 430, 299 N. Y. Supp.
688 (4th Dept. 1937).
'Devitt v. Continental Casualty Ins. Co., 269 N. Y. 474, 199 N. E. 765
(1936).
'In Hartley v. Miller, 165 Mich. 115, 130 N. W. 336 (1911), the defendant
loaned his automobile to a friend and was persuaded to accompany him. The
plaintiff was injured through the negligent manner in which the car was driven
by the defendant's friend and brought action against the owner. The court held
that at the time of the accident the automobile was not subject to his control
and he was, therefore, not liable for the negligent way in which it was driven,




exclusive possession and control of the vehicle.2 9 The position of the
bailor was, therefore, unlike that of the principal or master in that he
had no control over the vehicle or the person driving it and conse-
quently the negligence of the bailee was not imputed to him.30
For the same reason, the doctrine was extended to the "family
car" and resulted in exempting the head of the household from lia-
bility for the negligence of a member of his family in operating the
car while pursuing his own pleasure.31 Thus, in Van Blaricum v.
Dodgson 3 2 the court refused to hold the defendant liable for damages
caused by the negligence of his son, while on an errand of his own,
even though the defendant-father knew of his son's use of the vehicle.
In 1909, there was an apparent attempt to extend, by judicial
legislation, the well established principles governing the liability of
the principal 3 3 and bailor-owner.3 4 A novel proposition was present-
ed in Ingram v. Stockamore,35 wherein the court held that "the owner
of an automobile should be responsible for injuries caused by it by the
negligence of anyone whom he permits to run it in the public street." 36
The practical results of the rule set forth in the Ingram case would
have been to extend the liability of an owner even beyond that im-
posed by present statutory provisions.37  The New York courts, how-
ever, bound by judicial precedent, refused to follow the Ingram case
and awaited legislative enactment regulating the liability of the owner.
' See Gochee v. Wagner, 257 N. Y. 344, 178 N. E. 553 (1931) ; Note (1931)
17 CORN. L. Q. 158.
Ibid. At common law the negligence of the bailee was not imputed to
the bailor when sued by a third person. When the bailor brought an action to
recover damages done to his vehicle due to the combined negligence of the bailee
and a third person, the bailee's negligence was imputed to the bailor and he was
precluded from a recovery. Present statutory provisions have not changed
this rule.
'Heissenbuttel v. Meagher, 162 App. Div. 752, 147 N. Y. Supp. 1087 (1st
Dept. 1914), aff'd, 221 N. Y. 511, 116 N. E. 1050 (1917); Kohlmeier v. Allen,
201 App. Div. 445, 194 N. Y. Supp. 597 (1st Dept. 1922); Powers v. Wilson,
203 App. Div. 232, 196 N. Y. Supp. 600 (3d Dept. 1922); see (1929) 64 A. L.
R. 844.
220 . Y. 111, 115 N. E. 443 (1917).
' See note 12, supra.
'See notes 17, 25, supra.
'63 Misc. 114, 118 N. Y. Supp. 399 (1909).
The case presented the following factual situation: The defendant loaned
his automobile to his chauffeur in order that the chauffeur could make a pleasure
trip with some friends. Chauffeur while on the trip negligently drove the
defendant's car into a carriage owned by the plaintiff, and as a result the
plaintiff was injured. The plaintiff brought action against both the defendant-
owner and the negligent chauffeur.
'The owner of a motor vehicle, under the rule laid down by the court in
the Ingrain case, supra, would apparently be liable for the negligence of a
driver in possession of the car with the consent of the owner, even though at
the time of the accident the driver was using the car in a manner expressly
prohibited by the owner. The court, therefore, held, in effect, that the automo-
bile was a dangerous instrumentality.
' See note 47, infra.
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III.
The long-awaited legislative aid came with the enactment of Sec-
tion 59 of the New York Vehicle and Traffic Law,38 which provides
that:
"Every owner of a motor vehicle or motorcycle operated upon
a public highway shall be liable and responsible for death or
injuries to person or property resulting from negligence in the
operation of such motor vehicle or motorcycle, in the business
of such owner or otherwise, by any person legally using or
operating the same with the permission, express or implied, of
such owner." (Italics ours.)
After considerable controversy the section was held to be consti-
tutional as a valid exercise of the police power of the state.3 9 The
undoubted purpose of the statute was to increase the liability of a
non-culpable owner of an automobile for its operation on public high-
ways. 4° The courts in their interpretation of the enactment presumed,
however, that the legislature intended to make no further innovations
upon the common law than was required by the situation to be rem-
edied, 41 and held therefore, that the section was intended to do no
more than to abrogate the common law rule 42 exempting the owner
of a loaned motor vehicle from liability for damages resulting from
its negligent operation by the borrower. Section 59 has, therefore,
in effect, changed the common law basis of imputing the negligence
of a driver to a non-culpable owner, in that at present a driver's neg-
ligence may be imputed to an owner not only when there is an exist-
ing relationship of master and servant or principal and agent,43 but
also when the driver (bailee) is using the automobile with the ex-
press or implied consent of the owner.4 4 The creation of the owner's
N. Y. CONS. LAws, c. 71 (Vehicle and Traffic Law) § 59.
'In Commissioners of Palisade Park v. Lent, 240 N. Y. 1, 5, 147 N. E.
228, 229 (1924), the court stated: "The state may prohibit the use of automo-
biles, except on such reasonable conditions as it may see fit to prescribe." Atkins
v. Hertz Drive-Ur-Self Stations, 261 N. Y. 352, 185 N. E. 408 (1933); People
ex rel. Albrecht v. Harnett, 221 App. Div. 487, 224 N. Y. Supp. 97 (4th Dept.
1927) ; McNutt Auto Delivery Co., 126 Misc. 730, 214 N. Y. Supp. 562 (1926).
4 Fluegel v. Coudert, 244 N. Y. 393, 155 N. E. 683 (1927); Plaumbo v.
Ryan, 213 App. Div. 517, 210 N. Y. Supp. 255 (2d Dept. 1925); Aarons v.
Standard Varnish Works, 163 Misc. 84, 296 N. Y. Supp. 312 (1937).
4' "Statutes changing the common law are to be strictly construed and it
will be held to be no further abrogated than the clear import of the language
used in the statutes absolutely requires." Dean v. Metropolitan Elevated Ry.,
119 N. Y. 540, 547, 23 N. E. 1054, 1055 (1890) ; see Cohen v. Neustadter, 247
N. Y. 207, 160 N. E. 12 (1928); Matter of Anderson, 91 App. Div. 563, 87
N. Y. Supp. 24 (2d Dept. 1904).
"See notes 30, 31, mrpra.
*' See case cited note 12, supra.
" Chaika v. Vandenberg, 252 N. Y. 101, 169 N. E. 103 (1930) ; 30 COL. L.
RE,. 563; see Note (1933) 3 BROOKLYN L. REv. 58.
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consent as an additional basis for rendering him liable has, of course,
rendered obsolete such cases as Potts v. Pardee 45 and Van Blaricum
v. Dodgson,46 for in the former the presence of the owner in the auto-
mobile would under our statute, constitute the necessary consent to
its use by the driver, and in the latter unprotested knowledge of use
would constitute implied consent.
The fact that an owner has loaned an automobile to another does
not, however, necessarily render him liable under all circumstances
for the negligence of the borrower. An owner may under present
statutory provisions, as at common law,47 so limit his consent to the
use of the vehicle, as to free himself from liability if the borrower
exceeds it.48
IV.
As has been already stated, the effects of the statute reached only
to those instances in which the owner of the vehicle loaned it to a
stranger or members of the family. 49 The common law principles,
therefore, are still applicable in cases wherein the relation of em-
ployer and employee exists and the car is being driven in the em-
ployer's business. 0  The test, therefore, in determining whether, in
any given case, an owner is liable for the servant's negligent driving
is still whether the servant, at the time of the accident, is acting within
the course and scope of his employmnent. 51
The term "scope of employment" is at best a vague term, in-
capable of being defined in conclusive terms. A determination of
whether at any given time the servant is acting within the scope of
his employment depends upon the facts of each case. 52 The test gen-
erally applied, however, is whether the servant-driver is, at the time
of the accident, engaged in the furtherance of his employer's business,
concerning which he was employed.53 It has consequently been con-
"220 N. Y. 431, 116 N. E. 78 (1917).
"1220 N. Y. 111, 115 N. E. 443 (1917).
'Goldberg v. Borden's Condensed Milk Co., 227 N. Y. 465, 125 N. E. 807(1920); Rolfe v. Hewitt, 227 N. Y. 486, 125 N. E. 804 (1920); see Rose v.
Balfe, 223 N. Y. 481, 119 N. E. 842 (1918) ; Psota v. L. I. Ry., 246 N. Y. 388,
159 N. E. 180 (1927); Rhodes v. Ocean Accident & Guarantee Corp., Ltd.,
239 App. Div. 92, 266 N. Y. Supp. 593 (4th Dept. 1933).
Cf. Arcara v. Moresse, 258 N. Y. 211, 179 N. E. 389 (1932).
" For interesting discussion on the point see EDGAR AND EDGAR, LAW OF
TORTS (3d ed. 1936) § 54.
" See note 25, supra.
'Grant v. Knepper, 245 N. Y. 158, 156 N. E. 650 (1927); Steele v. C. G.
Meaker Co., 131 Misc. 675, 227 N. Y. Supp. 644 (1928).
' See cases cited note 12, sitpra.
'See HUFFCuT, AGENCY (2d ed. 1901) § 245.
Freiberg v. Brady, 143 App. Div. 220, 128 N. Y. Supp. 121 (1st Dept.
1911); Cullen v. Thomas, 150 App. Div. 475, 135 N. Y. Supp. 22 (1st Dept.
1912) ; Amann v. Thurston, 133 Misc. 293, 231 N. Y. Supp. 657 (1928), aff'd,
19391]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
sistently held that the negligence of a driver is not imputable to his
employer, when at the time of the accident the driver is on business
of his own without the owner's consent, or acting solely for the bene-
fit of a third person.
54
A review of cases dealing with the scope of a servant's employ-
ment discloses that in numerous instances, novel factual situations
render difficult the application of the rules governing the master-
servant relationship. Particularly outstanding in this respect are
Bindert v. Elmhurst Taxi Corp.55 and Babington v. Yellow Taxi
Corp.5 6
In the Bindert case 57 one of the defendant's cab drivers was
hailed by another cab driver, whose cab had been stolen, and directed
to pursue the stolen cab. At the trial it was conceded that the person
who had hailed the defendant's cab had no intention of becoming a
fare-paying passenger and also that the defendant's driver did not
pull down the meter flag to register a fare. While in pursuit of the
stolen cab, the defendant's driver negligently collided with the plain-
tiff's automobile. The plaintiff brought action against the defendant
cab company to recover for damage done to his car. The court dis-
missed the complaint on the ground that at the time of the accident
the driver was not acting within the course and scope of his employ-
ment, stating that the duties of the driver were clear, i.e., "to receive
and transport passengers for hire; it was not part of his duties to
perform police functions without the defendant's permission, expressed
or implied."
In the opinion of the writer the decision reached in this case can
be justified on the ground that at the time of the accident the defen-
dant's driver was carrying a person from whom he intended to re-
ceive no payment. The fact that 'the defendant was engaged in the
business of transporting passengers for hire would seem to negative
any inference that the driver could use the cab for solely gratuitous
purposes. 58 It is submitted that the position of the defendant-owner
224 App. Div. 782, 230 N. Y. Supp. 794 (4th Dept. 1928) ; Irolla v. City of
New York, 155 Misc. 908, 280 N. Y. Supp. 873 (1935); Davies v. Anglo-
American Auto Tire Co., 145 N. Y. Supp. 341 (Sup. Ct. T. T. 1913).
' O'Brien v. Steam Brothers, 223 N. Y. 290, 119 N. E. 550 (1918); Matter
of Kowalek v. N. Y. Cons. R. R., 229 N. Y. 489, 128 N. E. 888 (1920); Cham-
pion W. & Mfg. Co., 230 N. Y. 309, 130 N. E. 304 (1921); Matter of Clark v.
Voorhees, 231 N. Y. 14, 131 N. E. 553 (1921) ; Der O'hannessian v. Elliot, 233
N. Y. 326, 135 N. E. 518 (1922); Benevento v. Poertner Motor Car Co., 235
N. Y. 125, 139 N. E. 213 (1923) ; Bryan v. Bunis, 208 App. Div. 389, 203 N. Y.
Supp. 634 (4th Dept. 1924) ; Keer v. Clark, 236 App. Div. 10, 257 N. Y. Supp.
869 (1st Dept. 1932) ; Rosenberg v. Syracuse Newspapers, Inc., 248 App. Div.
294, 289 N. Y. Supp. 91 (4th Dept. 1936).
'168 Misc. 892, 6 N. Y. Supp. (2d) 666 (1938).
250 N. Y. 14, 164 N. E. 726 (1928).
See note 55, supra.
'In Salomone v. Yellow Taxi Corp., 242 N. Y. 251, 257, 151 N. E. 442,
444 (1926), the court refused to hold the defendant taxi owner liable for the
negligence of one of its drivers, where it appeared that the driver was carrying
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was, therefore, analogous to that of an owner whose chauffeur invites
strangers to ride contrary to orders, and as has already been stated, 9
in such cases the owner is not liable for injuries sustained by the
invitee.
In the Babington case 60 a police officer jumped on the running
board of one of the defendant's cabs and commanded its driver to
chase another car in order to arrest its occupant. While the taxi
driver was in pursuit of the fleeing car, he collided with another car
and was killed.61 The driver's widow sought compensation under
the Workmen's Compensation Law,62 which provides that certain
classes of employers are liable for the disability or death of their em-
ployees caused by injury, "arising out of and in the course of em-
ployment." 63
In affirming an award of the State Industrial Board, the court
in the Babington case based its decision chiefly on the mandatory pro-
visions of Section 1848 of the N. Y. Penal Law 64 which makes it a
misdemeanor for anyone to refuse, when ordered by a police officer,
to aid in making an arrest.
In holding that the death of the taxicab driver occurred while he
passengers who had no intention of paying a fare. The court held that the
"* * * [defendant] is answerable for the acts of * ** [its driver] when acting
as its servant in the course of his employment. It is not liable if he were
accommodating his friends."
v See note 47, supra.
'0 See note 56, supra.
' See cases cited note 20, supra. It is difficult to see, how, in the Babijnton
case, supra, the defendant owner had control over its driver, for even if it had
given express instructions to its driver not to aid a police officer under the
mandatory provisions of Section 1848, it would appear that such instruction
would not be binding upon the driver. The driver was under a duty under all
circumstances to aid an officer when called upon to do so.
N. Y. WORK. ComP. LAw § 10 as amended by L. 1922, c. 615; L. 1933,
c. 384, and L. 1934, c. 769:
"Every employer * * * shall *** except as otherwise provided *** secure
compensation to his employees and pay or provide compensation for their
disability or death from injury arising out and in thw course of the employment
without regard to fault as a cause of the injury, except that there shall be no
liability for compensation under this chapter when-the injury has been solely
occasioned by intoxication of the injured employee while on duty or by wilful
intention of the injured employee to bring about the injury or death of himself
or another." (Italics ours.)
For injuries arising out of and in the course of employment see cases
Heidemann v. American District Telegraph Co., 230 N. Y. 305, 130 N. E. 302
(1921); Costello v. Taylor, 217 N. Y. 179, Ill N: E. 755 (1916); Smith v.
Price, 168 App. Div. 421, 153 N. Y. Supp. 221 (3d Dept. 1915); Miller v.
Taylor, 173 App. Div. 865, 159 N. Y. Supp. 999 (3d Dept. 1916).
Cf. Newman v. Newman, 169 App. Div. 745, 155 N. Y. Supp. 665 (3d Dept.
1915).
I'N. Y. PENAL LAW § 1848 as amended by L. 1932, c. 480: "A person,
who, after having been lawfully commanded to aid an officer in arresting any
person, or in re-taking any person who has escaped from legal custody, or in
executing any legal process, wilfully neglects or refuses to aid such officer is
guilty of a misdemeanor * * *"
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was acting within the scope of his employment, Chief Justice Cardozo
stated that under Section 1848 of the Penal Law 6' the defendant-
owner was chargeable with knowledge "that driver and car alike
would have to answer to the officer's call. The * * * [driver] in
charge of the car could not desert it without peril to his master's in-
terests. The fact that while protecting it for his master, he used it
incidentally to preserve the public peace, was not such a departure
from the course of duty as to constitute an abandonment of his em-
ployment."
The court in the Bindert case attempted to reconcile its decision
with that of the Babington case on the narrow ground that the factual
situations presented in the two cases were vastly different in that in
the latter case the driver's aid was demanded by a police officer, while
in the Bindert case the driver's assistance was requested by a private
individual. It is submitted that the two cases cannot be reconciled
on that ground, or in fact on any other ground, for, in the opinion of
the writer, the majority opinion in the Babington case seems to have
disregarded the well-established rule that the negligence of a servant-
driver is imputed to an owner only when the owner has control over
the driver.6 6 As stated by Justice Kellogg in a dissenting opinion:
"Unquestionably when the employee driver in obedience to a lawful
command gave aid to the police he became himself a member of the
police department. The direction which he took, the speed at which
he drove his cab-these became subject to the supervision and control
of the policeman on the running board. Since, from then on, in all his
movements he must have yielded obedience, not to his original em-
ployer, but to the officer, he ceased to be a servant of the former and
became a servant of the police department of the government."
The view expressed by Justice Kellogg seems logical and is in
accord with the few cases dealing with the point.6 7 A closely similar
situation was presented in Kennelly v. Stearns Salt & Lumber Co. 68
wherein the court refused to allow recovery under the Michigan Work-
men's Compensation Law, for the loss of a railroad employee's eye
while fighting a forest fire under the command of a fire marshal, even
though existing statutory provisions made it a misdemeanor to refuse
to obey such order.
The decision in the Bindert case, 69 though contrary to that in the
Ibid.
'See note 20, srupra.
Monterey County v. Industrial Accident Commission, 199 Cal. 221, 248
Pac. 912 (1926); West Salem v. Industrial Commission, 162 Wis. 57, 155 N. W.
929 (1916).
There are no cases in New York directly in point. The cases cited above,
however, held that a person commandeered to do an act for the state became a
servant of the state, and thus entitled to compensation under state laws provid-
ing compensation for officers of the municipality injured while acting within the
course of their employment.
- 190 Mich. 628, 157 N. W. 378 (1912).
168 Misc. 892, 6 N. Y. Supp. (2d) 666 (1938).
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Babington case, 7 however, did not have the effect of overruling the
latter, for a comparison of the two cases clearly shows that the court
in each instance was faced with an entirely different problem.
The Babington case 71 involved an interpretation of Section 1848
of the Penal Law 72 and the application of Section 10 of the Work-
men's Compensation Law.73 The court, in extending the scope of
employment beyond the bounds set by other adjudicated cases 74 on
point, undoubtedly had in mind the purpose for which the Workmen's
Compensation Law was enacted, namely, providing greater security
for the employee in the way of compensation for injuries and death
sustained while engaged in his master's business. 5
The Babington case left open the question of liability of an owner
under the circumstances therein presented for injury done to a third
person. In view of the court's ruling, it would seem to follow as a
necessary conclusion that the owner would be liable for injury to a
third person, for if the driver were acting within the course of his
employment in one case, it would seem paradoxical to say that injury
done to a third person would alter that fact.
Any extension of the doctrine advanced by the court would seem
to place upon an owner of an automobile liability commensurate with
that of a dangerous instrumentality.76
WILLIAm F. PODESTA.




7' Notes 67, 68, supra; see (1929) 61 A. L. R. 1358; (1939) 42 HARv. L.
REv. 713.
' Post v. Burger, 216 N. Y. 544, 111 N. E. 351 (1916), aff'g, 168 App. Div.
403, 153 N. Y. Supp. 505 (3d Dept. 1915); "The purposes of the act are to
provide for injuries sustained or deaths incurred by employees in the hazardous
employments specified in the statute without regard to fault as a cause thereof."
Lindebauer v. Weiner, 94 Misc. 612, 159 N. Y. Supp. 987 (1916).
See notes 4, 14, supra.
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